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Abstract – We motivate and offer a formal definition of 
validation as it applies to information fusion systems. 
Common definitions of validation compare the actual 
state of the world with that derived by the fusion process. 
This definition conflates properties of the fusion system 
with properties of systems that intervene between the 
world and the fusion system. We propose an alternative 
definition where validation of an information fusion 
system references a standard fusion device, such as 
recognized human experts. We illustrate the approach by 
describing the validation process implemented in RAID, a 
program conducted by DARPA and focused on 
information fusion in adversarial, deceptive 
environments.   
Keywords: validation, state estimation, information 
fusion metric, fusion experiments, deception. 
1 Introduction 
The concept and term validation appear infrequently in the 
fusion literature [1, 2]. A rigorous definition of validation 
as it applies to information fusion does not seem to exist. 
On the other hand, the field of modeling and simulation 
does offer extensive literature focused on validation, and 
this may be a good starting point for our discussion. In [3], 
validation is defined as a process that determines the 
degree to which a model or simulation is an accurate 
representation of the real world from the perspective of the 
intended uses of the model or simulation. 
Consider how one can apply this definition to 
information fusion. As illustrated in Fig. 1, the fusion 
function F (a system that performs fusion) receives 
streams of information {r} from observer-reporter R (often 
consisting of sensors, human observers, etc.) and 
transforms these inputs into an estimate of the true state of 
the observed world W. In many practical cases, the world 
includes elements that wish to conceal or misrepresent 
their actions and intent; these elements—let us call them 
the deceiver D—attempt to disguise or corrupt some of the 
information available to the observer-reporter R. 
Validation of a given fusion system F, then, can be 
defined as a (usually experimental) proof that F is likely 
(in a probabilistic sense) to estimate the true state S of the 
world W with an error that does not exceed an acceptable 
value δ: 
P(|S-S’| < δ) > θ,        (1) 
where S’=F({r})=F(R(D(S))) is the estimate produced by 
the fusion system F; S is the true state of the world W,  δ is 
the maximum acceptable error, and θ is the minimum 
acceptable probability that the estimate does not exceed δ. 
Here |S-S’| is a domain-specific metric that quantifies the 
differences between the two states. Later in this paper, we 
bring practical examples of such metrics. Henceforth, we 
call the approach defined by Fig. 1 and Equation (1) 
Validation Type 1.   
 However, we find this definition unsatisfactory in 
practice. Because the error |S-S’| depends on the 
competency of observer R and deceiver D as much as on 
efficacy of fusion F, a fusion system that is well validated 
for the given R and D may be invalid for a different R or 
different D. In many practical environments, R and 
especially D vary widely—we will give an example of 
such an environment shortly. In other words, the above 
definition of validation conflates the efficacy of the fusion 
process F with craftiness of D or inadequacy of R. This is 
not a helpful characterization of F. 
 
Figure 1. Validation by comparing the real-world state 
with the state estimated by the fusion system. 
Therefore, we offer a different definition. Assume we 
have a fusion device G accepted as a standard of 
performance in fusion. Then, we can define the validation 
of a given fusion system F as a proof (Fig. 2) that F is 
likely to estimate the true state S of the world W with an 
error no greater than the error produced by the standard 
fusion device G: 
P(|S-S’|<|S-S”|) > θ,          (2) 
where S’=F({r}) is the estimate produced by fusion system 
F, S” is the estimate produced by the standard fusion 
device G, S is the true state of the world W, and θ is the 
minimum acceptable probability that the error of S’ is 
within the bounds of the standard device’s error. 
Henceforth, we call the approach defined by Fig. 2 and 
Equation (2) Validation Type 2. 
 The key advantage of the Type 2 approach is that it 
mitigates the conflation of fusion properties with those of 
R and D. Indeed, consider two deceivers D1 and D2 of 
greatly different effectiveness. In Validation Type 1, the 
apparent fusion error |S-S’D1| may differ greatly from |S-
S’D2|. Not so in Validation Type 2. Under a reasonable 
assumption that for all S and D of interest |F(D(S))-
G(D(S))|< δ, it can be readily shown that |S-S’|-|S-S”| 
remains relatively constant (within δ) regardless of D. 
But where does one find a “standard fusion device” with 
which to compare a given F for the purposes of Validation 
Type 2? In practice, we argue, one can use human experts 
or a legacy fusion system as a standard of comparison. In 
the remainder of the paper, we describe a particular case in 
which we implemented this validation approach. 
 
Figure 2. Validation by comparing the estimation error of 
the fusion system with that of an accepted standard. 
2 An Illustrative Problem  
The validation work described in this paper was a part of 
the research program titled Real-time Adversarial 
Intelligence and Decision-making (RAID) sponsored by 
the United States’ Defense Advanced Research Programs 
Agency (DARPA) during the period of 2004-2008 [4]. 
The objective of the program was to build tools for fusion 
in military operations. The tools were to estimate in real-
time the enemy’s likely goals, deceptions, actions, 
movements and positions. Although many types of 
military operations can benefit from such capabilities, the 
RAID program focused on an intentionally narrow but still 
very challenging domain: the in-execution, tactical combat 
of infantry (supported by armor and air platforms) against 
a guerilla-like enemy force in an urban terrain. (In the 
following discussion, we adhere to the US military 
convention: the military force that uses the RAID system 
is called the friendly or “Blue” force, while their opponent 
is called the enemy or “Red” force.) 
 In a typical problem addressed by RAID, a largely 
infantry Blue Force operates in an urban terrain against an 
insurgent-like irregular infantry Red Force. Real-world 
examples of such military engagements include 
Mogadishu [5] and Fallujah [6]. The problem may involve 
the defense of Blue facilities, the rescue of downed 
aircrew, the capture of an insurgent leader, the rescue of 
hostages or the reaction to an attack on a Blue patrol.  
 To illustrate such a problem, consider a scenario where 
Blue forces receive the task to protect four buildings. The 
Red’s objective was to attack any number of those four 
facilities to inflict casualties and damage. The scenario left 
both forces with a very broad range of tactical options. For 
example, Blue forces could attempt to move quickly into 
defensive positions around the designated buildings. Some 
Red forces were initially closer to the buildings of interest 
and could cause damage and casualties while Blue forces 
were enroute. The success of the Blue force’s mission was 
influenced in particular by how quickly Blue forces were 
in place around the attacked buildings and how much (or 
how little) fire the buildings received from the Red forces. 
The Red forces could attack all the target buildings, or 
focus their efforts on only one or two of them. The Blue 
commander could try to protect all the buildings, or leave 
unprotected a single building to protect better the 
remaining buildings. In most cases, the Red force would 
attempt to deceive the Blue force by concealment and 
other means [7]. 
 In an illustrative problem like this, the Blue force could 
be a company comprised of 10-30 infantry fire-teams 
(each typically with four foot soldiers armed with rifles 
and light machine guns) and 2-8 armored attack vehicles, 
supported by artillery or attack helicopters. The Red forces 
could consist of 20-40 teams (each typically consisting of 
about three foot fighters armed with assault rifles, rocket 
propelled grenade launchers, machine guns and remotely 
activated bombs. The battle area could be about 10-30 
square kilometers with multiple single-story or multistory 
buildings. The time scale of such a battle could be about 
two to twelve hours. 
3 Fusion Input and Output 
In planning and executing a battle like this, the company 
commander, his supporting staff (including possibly the 
staff at the higher echelon of command) and his 
subordinate unit leaders would receive and fuse (mentally 
or with the aid of computerized fusion system like RAID) 
a bewildering array of information [8]. These are the {r} in 
Fig 1 and 2. Some of this information is relatively immune 
to adversarial manipulation. For example, information on 
the Blue force composition and mission plan; detailed 
maps of the area, potentially including detailed 3D data of 
the urban area; known concentrations of non-combatants 
such as markets; culturally sensitive areas such as worship 
houses; reports of historic and recent prior activities such 
as explosions of roadside bombs in the area; continuous 
updates on the locations and status of the Blue force as 
they move before and during the battle.  
 Other input information would be highly incomplete, 
often erroneous, and potentially distorted by the Red 
concealment and deception. For example, Blue forces’ 
reports (electronic, verbal or textual) regarding the 
observed positions and strength of the Red force, or fires 
received from the Red force; prior information about the 
Red force’s tactics, and preferences; estimates of the Red 
force locations, strengths, equipment, probable mission, 
morale, competency, intent and plan; assessments of 
outcomes of alternative battle plans for Red and Blue 
forces. Much of this input information is highly dynamic: 
it arrives and changes as the battle unfolds.  
 As far as the output of the fusion process, i.e., the S’ in 
Fig. 1 and 2, users typically desire two types of 
information. First is the estimate of the Red force’s current 
situation: estimated actual locations of the Red force (most 
of which are normally concealed and are not observed by 
the Blue force); the current intent of the Red force, and 
potential deceptions that the Red force may be performing. 
Generation of such an estimate is often called Level-2 
fusion [9].  
 The second type of fused information describes the 
estimated future events: Red force’s future locations (as a 
function of time), movements, fire engagements with the 
Blue force, changes in strengths and intent. Generation of 
such an estimate is often called Level-3 fusion [9]. It may 
also include recommendations to the Blue force regarding 
the suitable ways to prevent or to parry such Red force 
actions.  
 The RAID system as a whole performs both Level-2 and 
Level-3 fusion. However, this paper focuses on only one 
aspect of the RAID effort that falls into the Level-2 fusion 
area. It is important to stress the adversarial nature of this 
fusion process: the correctness of the fused output can 
suffer if the Red force intentionally distorts the input 
information. By cleverly concealing some actual 
information while creating and exposing false information, 
the Red force can lead the Blue force’s fusion process 
toward erroneous (and at least partially predictable to the 
Red force) conclusions. The use of such a misleading 
fused product can be catastrophic for the Blue force. 
4 Overview of the Fusion System 
The RAID system consists of two major components, the 
Adversarial Reasoning Module (ARM) and the Deception 
Reasoning Module (DRM). In addition, the Combat 
Simulation System simulates the events occurring on the 
battlefield. 
 There are two major inputs to the RAID system, 
battlefield models and situational information. The 
battlefield models include internal models of the terrain 
(3-D terrain data to include doors, windows, floors, and 
other details of the landscape); internal models of Red and 
Blue resources (weapons parameters to include range, 
lethality, probabilities of acquisition and destruction, 
platform parameters to include minimum, maximum and 
average speeds, vulnerability to specific weapons); and 
internal models of actions (to include influence of goals 
and objectives (speed, safety, success) on the selection of 
tactics).  
 Situational information includes Red and Blue force 
strength, location, and movement and is comprised of 
intelligence data and updates from deployed sensors and 
operational data from both mission planning and 
operational reports from the deployed forces. The output 
of the RAID system includes estimates of Red current 
situation and future actions, and recommendations for the 
Blue force.  
 The DRM identifies the current Red situation 
(corresponding mainly to Level-2 fusion), including 
probable Red concealments and deceptions. The DRM 
provides the ARM with probable locations and 
concentrations of un-observed Red assets for use in the 
ARM calculations.  
 The ARM generates estimates of the future Red actions 
and recommendations for the Blue actions, either on-
demand or in response to battle situation changes. As 
information regarding the battlefield situation (locations, 
strengths, postures, actions, etc.) of Red and Blue troops 
becomes available or changes, the ARM generates a new 
or modified set of estimates. In this paper, we focus on a 
subset of DRM and do not address ARM.  
 The Combat Simulation System was not a part of RAID 
proper, but served only the purposes of experimentation. It 
used the US Army simulation system called OneSAF 
Testbed Baseline (OTB) [10] with certain modifications to 
meet the needs of RAID experimentation. Both Blue and 
Red forces were controlled by specially trained human 
operators. 
 Fusion algorithms of RAID are beyond the scope of this 
paper and are discussed elsewhere [4, 11, 12, 13]. 
5 Validation Experiments  
As discussed in the Introduction, if we were to judge the 
fusion accuracy of RAID by comparing its fused output 
with real-world state, the results would depend greatly on 
the effectiveness of the observers-reporters (Blue force) 
and on effectiveness of deceivers (Red force). The 
effectiveness of the observers-reporters and of deceivers, 
however, varies greatly depending on a battle situation. 
Thus, we elected to use the Validation Type 2 approach 
summarized in Equation (2).    
 Another consideration in our validation methodology 
was to include experimental cases of sufficient military 
realism and complexity, to validate the technology in 
reference to its intended military use. Ideally, real-world 
examples of military operation would provide specific data 
for experimental assessments. Unfortunately, we found 
very few suitable real-world cases where actual enemy 
situation data were available with sufficient fidelity and 
certainty. Live-force wargames, often very realistic [14], 
could be an alternative to real-world cases. However, 
introduction of new technologies in such live-force 
wargames is difficult and expensive, and it is rarely 
possible to control the content of the wargames to any 
significant extent.  
 These considerations led us to the following concept of 
experiment. Each experiment consisted of multiple 
wargames executed by live Red and Blue commanders but 
in a simulated computer wargaming environment. We 
selected a wargaming environment that the US military 
widely used and recognized as relatively realistic. In half 
of the wargames the Blue commander received the support 
of a human team of competent assistants (staff) who in 
effect played the role of the standard fusion device G in 
Fig. 2. Their responsibilities included producing running 
estimates S”. This set of wargames constituted the control 
group. In the other half of wargames Blue commander 
operated without a human staff. Instead, he obtained a 
similar support from the RAID fusion system which 
produced S’. These wargames constituted the test group. 
The data collection and redaction process compared the 
accuracy of the control group with the accuracy of the test 
group, as in Fig. 2.  
5.1 Validation Experiments’ Structure  
The Red cell (Fig.3) was a group of military experts, 
typically 5-6 retired officers specially trained to 
impersonate Red force in military wargames. The Red cell 
acted as the decision-makers of the Red force and 
commanded the simulated Red fighters. The Red cell 
operated in so called free-play mode (i.e., they were not 
constrained by a pre-conceived plan of actions) and 
emulated an intelligent, innovative, hard-to-anticipate 
adversary. 
 
Figure 3. The structure of the validation experiments. 
Compare to Fig. 2. 
 The Red force’s creative use of urban terrain, rapid 
movement in the familiar city, concealment, deceptions, 
ambushes, remotely controlled bombs, rocket-propelled 
grenades, heavy machine guns, infiltration and civilian 
spies challenged the simulated Blue forces and their 
human commanders. We physically separated the Red cell 
from the Blue cell, and took a number of precautions to 
prevent information exchange between the Red and Blue 
subjects. In particular, the Red cell did not know if a given 
wargame was a control wargame (with the human staff) or 
a test wargame (with the RAID system). Exit interviews 
with the Red cell confirmed that they were not able to 
discern whether their opponent was human or computer-
assisted.  
 The Blue cell of control wargames was a commander 
supported by four assistants (staff). The Blue cell acted as 
the decision-makers of the Blue force and commanded the 
simulated Blue soldiers. Typically, the commander was a 
retired or active-duty officer of the US Army. Ranks of the 
officers varied from captain to lieutenant colonel. The 
ranks of the staff members varied from senior non-
commissioned officers to majors.  
 The Blue cell of test wargames was a human 
commander supported by the RAID system, which acted 
as a surrogate staff. RAID received the same information 
that was available to the staff of the control wargames.  
 The simulation system executed the commands of the 
Blue and Red cells and simulated the movements, 
observations, fires and physical effects experienced by the 
opposing forces and by the civilians caught in the fire.  
 The control cell included 3-5 persons responsible for 
initiating the wargame and resolving occasional 
breakdowns and anomalies in the wargaming process. The 
data collection cell included 3-6 people who operated the 
automated data collection software.  
5.2 Experimental Procedure  
We conducted experiments approximately every 6 months 
during the years 2004-2006. Each experiment included 20-
30 wargames executed over the period of about two 
weeks. Adding the time required for hardware and 
software installation, testing, and subject training, each 
experiment took approximately four weeks. Experiments 
included different versions of the RAID software as its 
maturity gradually increased. Locations of experiments 
varied, and most took place at military bases. The typical 
physical setting was a comfortable conference room, and 
there was no attempt to emulate the extreme physical and 
psychological stress factors that attend the real-world 
battle command. The wargames were randomly divided in 
two approximately comparable groups (control group and 
test group) based on the assessments of SME. In each 
experiment, several subjects (members of the Blue cell) 
acted as commanders. We randomized the allocation of a 
wargame to a commander and to a time period within the 
experiment.  
 Each wargame took between 90 and 150 minutes; there 
were 2-3 wargames per day. Each wargame differed from 
others by initial situation of the forces, missions, 
objectives, and other significant details.  
 At the start of a wargame, the control cell met with Blue 
and Red cell (separately), explained the military situation 
and the objectives (different and suitable to the Red and 
Blue perspectives), and gave them such partial information 
about their respective enemy that could be realistically 
available to each side through their respective means of 
military intelligence. For example, the control cell would 
provide the Blue cell with accurate observations on 
locations and strengths of about 20% of the Red forces. 
Following a brief period of planning and preparation (15-
30 minutes), the Blue and Red forces would begin the 
battle.  
 During the battle of a control wargame, the Blue 
commander and his supporting staff continually received 
information {r} from the simulation system. The 
simulation system provided the Blue cell with accurate 
and complete information on the location of Blue forces, 
and such partial and potentially inaccurate observations of 
the Red forces that would be realistically available to the 
soldiers and sensors of the Blue force.  
 Examples of observations {r} included seeing several 
enemy fighters with rocket launchers on the roof of a 
building 400 meters away, or receiving machine gun fire 
from a window of a building.  
 The Blue commander and staff collaboratively and 
continually formulated and updated their estimates of the 
enemy situation (“Where are they hiding? How strong are 
they? What are they going to do next?”). For data 
collection purposes, we asked the staff to keep their 
estimates S” depicted on a computer screen, which they 
tended to update every few minutes.  
 Staff also provided recommendations to the commander 
regarding the possible actions he could take in the 
unfolding battle. The nature and specific procedures of 
collaboration between the commander and the staff 
members varied depending on the style and preferences of 
a particular commander, as it would be the case in the real 
world.  
 Having made his decision, the commander would issue a 
command-via a simulated radio link–to his forces, e.g., for 
a particular platoon or squad to change the direction of its 
advance. The tempo of operations was high, situation on 
the battlefield changed rapidly, and the commander had to 
issue commands nearly non-stop, although lulls of 2-5 
minutes were also common. The commands issued by the 
commander went to a special group of 4-5 operators who 
translated the military-style commands into clicks at the 
simulation system interface. Operations of the Red cell 
were roughly similar to the ones described above.  
 During the test wargames, the Blue cell included only 
the commander. The role of staff was assumed by the 
RAID fusion system, which received the same information 
{r} that would be otherwise provided to the Blue staff. 
RAID generated estimates S’ of the enemy situation and 
displayed this information when the commander asked for 
it (with a single button click), which typically occurred 
every 5-15 minutes depending on the commander’s style 
and the battle situation. RAID generated and presented an 
updated estimate to the commander within the time 
acceptable to the users (between 30 and 300 seconds [4]).  
 During the wargame, the data collection cell used both 
computerized and manual means to collect continually the 
relevant information. This included discussions and 
decisions of the Blue staff, estimates S” produced by the 
Blue staff (in control wargames), estimates S’ produced by 
RAID (in the test wargames), commands of the Blue 
commander, events occurring on the battlefield, Red and 
Blue casualties, and locations of the Blue and Red forces, 
i.e., the actual state S. 
 The RAID estimates automatically entered a 
computerized experiment log, and included estimated 
location of each entity at 1-minute increments. Collecting 
estimate data from the human staff was more challenging. 
The staff required time to analyze and produce the 
estimate, and to translate the estimate onto the data 
collection form. To reduce the time to collect the data, we 
provide the staff members with an automated data 
collection tool. As the run progressed, the staff generates 
new estimates approximately every 15 minutes. 
5.3 Experimental Scenarios  
Each scenario represented a battle in an urban terrain 
where a largely dismounted Blue Force operated against 
an insurgent-like irregular dismounted Red Force. The 
scenarios drew inspiration and realistic details from actual 
military engagements in Iraq in 2003-2006, and other 
urban battles. The situations included the defense of Blue 
government facilities, the rescue of downed aircrew, the 
capture of an insurgent leader, the rescue of hostages, or 
the reaction to an attack on a Blue patrol. For the sake of 
simplicity, we used only a few mission types. These were 
Point/Area Attack (Blue forces attack a specific target or 
area), Point/Area Defense (Blue forces protect specific 
buildings and clear all Red forces from a specific area) and 
Withdrawal (all Blue forces congregate at a designated 
location).  
 In a typical scenario, the Blue forces consisted of 18 
teams (each with four dismounted soldiers armed with 
assault rifles and light machine guns) and five armored 
attack vehicles. For battle control purposes, the 18 teams 
operated as three platoons of six teams each with one 
simulation operator controlling each platoon. The Red 
forces consisted of 20 teams (each with three dismounted 
fighter armed with assault rifles and rocket propelled 
grenade launchers). Being more familiar with the terrain, 
Red forces moved somewhat faster than the Blue force. 
The battle area was a 2-kilometer (Km) by 2 Km region of 
a city with numerous multistory buildings. By experiment 
design, each scenario took about two hours to complete 
the mission. Prior to the wargame, both the Red and the 
Blue team received partial information regarding the 
opponent, such as location, strength, and possible intent of 
the opposing forces. The information typically covered 
only about 20-25% of the opposing force.  
5.4 Metrics 
In order to compute |S-S’| and |S-S”| in Equation (2), we 
had to develop a suitable metric that objectively measures 
the accuracy of estimated Red locations and strengths. One 
can view a running estimate of Red situation as a 
distribution of Red strength over the battlefield area. 
Experiments provide us with three such distributions (i.e., 
S, S’, S” in Equation 2): one is the actual locations and 
strengths of the Red force recorded in the simulation log; 
the second is the estimate produced by the human staff, 
and the third is the estimate produced by RAID. If we 
have a metric that characterizes the distance between two 
distributions-specifically RAID-vs-actual and staff-vs-
actual–we could determine whether staff’s estimate or 
RAID’s estimate is closer to the actual Red situation. 
 Figure 4. A CEP-like metric for comparing the estimates 
produced by the RAID fusion system with real world. 
 A common metric for measuring the distance between 
two distributions is the Prohorov Metric [15]. 
Unfortunately, we found the Prohorov metric 
computationally intractable for our problem.  Other 
common metrics are the Lp norms that provide a measure 
of the error (or distance) between two functions. As p 
increases, the metric increases the emphasis on large errors 
at single locations over small errors distributed across the 
full metric space. 
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Figure 5. Plot of the estimate accuracy as a function of the 
time into the wargame. Smaller value of CEP measure 
indicates greater accuracy of estimates.    
 Unfortunately, we found the Lp norms have a major 
disadvantage: SME do not perceive them as domain-
relevant or intuitive. To provide domain relevance, we 
sought a physical measure of the estimate accuracy. We 
noted that military community uses Circular Error 
Probable (CEP) as a measure of the precision of a 
weapons system [16]. CEP is the radius of a circle into 
which a projectile will land 50% of the time, assuming the 
center of the circle is the actual aim point.  
 For the purposes of RAID experiments, we created a 
CEP-analogue for location estimate accuracy. Imagine 
drawing circles centered at all estimated locations and then 
enlarging the radius of each circle until 50% of the actual 
locations are contained within the circles (see Fig. 4). The 
result was a physical measure (in meters) that provides a 
domain relevant measure of the closeness between the 
estimated and actual locations. Although well received by 
domain experts, the CEP measure does have its 
drawbacks. It is not a true metric and also does not scale 
well, i.e., the measure only considers the best half of the 
estimated distribution, moving to measure that considered 
a 60% overlap could lead to significantly different 
conclusions. 
5.5 Comparing Errors of Fused Estimates  
With the CEP-like metric, we can use our experimental 
data to determine the values of |S-S’|, |S-S”| and P(|S-
S’|<|S-S”|) of Equation (2). 
 Fig. 5 shows a comparison of the RAID-produced 
estimates S’ and staff-produced estimates S” of Red 
current locations and strengths: CEP measure as a function 
of the time since the wargame started. For the CEP 
measure, smaller is better. The line is a Lowess smoother 
[17] through the respective RAID and staff data points. As 
would be intuitively expected, both the RAID and staff 
estimates get better as the wargame proceeds. 
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Figure 6. The cumulative probability on the y-axis for a 
range of estimate accuracy measures shown on the x-axis. 
In this plot, the higher line indicates better estimate.  
 Cumulative probability plots provide a graphical display 
of the estimated probability regression equation. The 
example in Fig. 6 displays the cumulative probability on 
the y-axis for a range of estimate accuracy measures 
shown on the x-axis. In this plot, the higher line indicates 
better estimate accuracy measures.  
 Reading the plot across from the y-axis, one can see the 
expected estimate accuracy measure for a given fraction 
percent of the estimates. For example, reading across from 
60% until each regression line is crossed, 60% of the 
RAID estimates had CEP measures of 76 meters or less 
compared with 60% of the staff estimates being measured 
as 115 meters or less.  
 Reading the plot up from the x-axis, one can see the 
fraction of estimates that were more accurate than a given 
value of CEP. For example, reading up from 50 meters 
until each of the regression lines is crossed, 9.6% of the 
staff estimates were 50 meters or less compared with 
33.9% of the RAID estimates being 50 meters or less. 
6 Conclusions 
One can perform validation of a fusion system by 
comparing its output errors with errors produced by an 
accepted standard fusion device, such as a group of human 
experts. Challenges of this approach include assuring that 
both fusion systems receive exactly the same information, 
and devising a domain-specific metric for assessing the 
magnitude of errors. In spite of these challenges, the 
approach can be implemented in practice, as we 
demonstrated in this paper.  
 The key advantage of this approach is mitigation of 
variability in the content of the input available to the 
fusion system. For example, when intentional concealment 
and deception are important factors in the problem 
domain, the information content available to the fusion 
system can vary drastically from problem to problem. In 
such cases, the fusion system is best evaluated by 
comparing its performance to the performance of an 
accepted “gold standard.” 
 The experimental comparative approach is also 
invaluable in guiding the process of system development. 
Deficiencies of a fusion system under development, and 
the root causes of the deficiencies, become clear. 
 It is worth mentioning here the practical outcomes of the 
fusion validation effort described in the paper. According 
to the publically available reports [18, 19], the United 
States Army has been in the process of adopting the RAID 
tool into its military intelligence systems and battle 
command systems.  
 In these applications, RAID is a tool for semi-automated 
generation of enemy estimates: its role is to anticipate the 
upcoming actions of the enemy, both before, and during 
the unfolding battle, in near real time. In domain-specific 
terms, RAID performs so-called enemy estimates in 
mission analysis and preparation, or running estimates 
during the execution of a mission. Such a capability 
involves elements of Level-2 and Level-3 information 
fusion and data mining.  
 As part of adapting RAID to the US Army requirements, 
the tool was tested in live-force (i.e., realistic wargames 
with real soldiers, combat vehicles, etc.) experiments 
conducted by the US Army in Fort Monmouth, NJ. There, 
a company commander and his subordinates used RAID 
while riding in a command and control vehicle, accessing 
RAID via the US Army battle command system called 
FBCB2 [20]. It was also used by the battalion staff at a 
workstation in the battalion tactical operations center.  
 Before and during a typical multi-hour mission, RAID 
continuously read information from FBCB2, such as 
enemy observations reports and reports of friendly 
positions. It also received input and assumptions from the 
battalion staff or the company commander. Then, 
combining such data, RAID generated running estimates 
of the enemy situation, e.g. likely ambushes, concealed 
enemy positions, routes of infiltration or retreat.  
 Another application considered for RAID is the US 
Army military intelligence fusion system called DCGS-A 
[21]. As of 2007, the reported plans were to integrate 
RAID technologies into an experimental version of 
DCGS-A, and to assess experimentally its value to users 
under variety of real-world operational conditions.     
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